CCC 1760

1756

It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

1757

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three "sources" of the morality of human acts.

1758

The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.

1759

"An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention" (cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). the end does not justify the means.

1760

A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

1761

There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

The Morality of the Passions

1762

The human person is ordered to beatitude by his deliberate acts: the passions or feelings he experiences can dispose him to it and contribute to it.

1763

The term "passions" belongs to the Christian patrimony. Feelings or passions are emotions or movements of the sensitive appetite that incline us to act or not to act in regard to something felt or imagined to be good or evil.

1764

The passions are natural components of the human psyche; they form the passageway and ensure the connection between the life of the senses and the life of the mind. Our Lord called man's heart the source from which the passions spring (Cf. Mk 7:21).