A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.
CCC 1764
There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
The Morality of the Passions
The human person is ordered to beatitude by his deliberate acts: the passions or feelings he experiences can dispose him to it and contribute to it.
The term "passions" belongs to the Christian patrimony. Feelings or passions are emotions or movements of the sensitive appetite that incline us to act or not to act in regard to something felt or imagined to be good or evil.
The passions are natural components of the human psyche; they form the passageway and ensure the connection between the life of the senses and the life of the mind. Our Lord called man's heart the source from which the passions spring (Cf. Mk 7:21).
There are many passions. the most fundamental passion is love, aroused by the attraction of the good. Love causes a desire for the absent good and the hope of obtaining it; this movement finds completion in the pleasure and joy of the good possessed. the apprehension of evil causes hatred, aversion, and fear of the impending evil; this movement ends in sadness at some present evil, or in the anger that resists it.
"To love is to will the good of another." (St. Thomas Aquinas, SThSumma Theologiae (St. Thomas Aquinas) I-II, 26, 4, corp. art.) All other affections have their source in this first movement of the human heart toward the good. Only the good can be loved (Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin., 8, 3, 4: PLPatrologia Latina (J. P. Migne) 42, 949-950). Passions "are evil if love is evil and good if it is good." (St. Augustine, De civ. Dei 14, 7, 2: PLPatrologia Latina (J. P. Migne) 41, 410)
In themselves passions are neither good nor evil. They are morally qualified only to the extent that they effectively engage reason and will. Passions are said to be voluntary, "either because they are commanded by the will or because the will does not place obstacles in their way." (St. Thomas Aquinas, SThSumma Theologiae (St. Thomas Aquinas) I-II, 24, 1 corp. art.) It belongs to the perfection of the moral or human good that the passions be governed by reason (Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, SThSumma Theologiae (St. Thomas Aquinas) I-II, 24, 3).
Strong feelings are not decisive for the morality or the holiness of persons; they are simply the inexhaustible reservoir of images and affections in which the moral life is expressed. Passions are morally good when they contribute to a good action, evil in the opposite case. the upright will orders the movements of the senses it appropriates to the good and to beatitude; an evil will succumbs to disordered passions and exacerbates them. Emotions and feelings can be taken up into the virtues or perverted by the vices.